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The purpose of this survey paper is to describe recent advances 
in multiattribute utility theory and group utility theory for multi- 
objective decision making. Firstly, single-attribute von Neumann- 
Morgenstern utility functions are briefly described. Secondly, for 
constructing multiattribute utility functions the concept of Keeney's 
utility independence among multiple attributes is described. Thirdly, 
the concept of convex dependence is introduced as a generalized concept 
of utility independence. Fourthly, for constructing group utility 
functions the concept of convex dependence among multiple decision 
makers is introduced. Algorithm of identifying multiattribute (and/or 
group) utility functions and some hypothetical examples for interpret- 
ing convex dependence are included. 
(Multiobjective decision making; Utility theory; Multiattribute utility 
function; Group utility function; Utility independence; Convex depend- 
ence) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mathematical modeling of preferences has been widely studied in 
multiattribute decision analysis. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) have de- 
scribed in detail the standard approach. A preference representation 
function under risk can be constructed as a utility function, however, 
it is practically impossible to directly identify a multiattribute 
utility function. Therefore, it is necessary to develop conditions 
that reduce the dimensionality of the functions that are required to 
identify. These conditions restrict the form of a multiattribute util- 
ity function in a decomposition theorem. 
Keeney and Kirkwood (1975) have extended the multiattribute util- 
ity theory for a decision maker to a group utility theory for multiple 
conflicting decision makers where a group utility function is con- 
structed postulating the utility independence properties among the 
multiple decision makers. 
In this paper after briefly describing a single-attribute utility 
function based on von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) expected util- 
ity hypothesis, additive, multilinear, and convex decompositions are 
described for multiattribute utility functions. These decompositions 
are based on additive and utility independence (Keeney and Raiffa, 
1976) and convex dependence (Tamura and Nakamura, 1983) conditions, re- 
spectively. The concept of convex dependence is a generalized concept 
of utility independence where we consider the change of decision 
maker's attitude towards risk. This concept generates various decompo- 
sitions which include Keeney's additive/multiplicative decompositions 
as special cases. For clarifying the interpretation of this concept an 
example of trading-off between environment and consumption is included 
(Tamura and Nakamura, 1978) .  
For  group d e c i s i o n  making w i t h  m u l t i p l e  d e c i s i o n  makers we de- 
s c r i b e  t h e  concep t  of  convex dependence between two ( c o n f l i c t i n g )  deci-  
s i o n  makers (Tamura and Yukimura, 1983).  T h i s  concept  c a n  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
change of  a t t i t u d e  of  each  d e c i s i o n  maker towards t h e  group u t i l i t y  de- 
pending upon t h e  u t i l i t y  l e v e l  of  t h e  o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  maker. For c l a r i -  
f y i n g  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  concept  a  h y p o t h e t i c a l  numer ica l  exam- 
p l e  f o r  s i t i n g  a  major  a i r p o r t  i s  inc luded .  
A s  a  p o s s i b l e  d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h ,  v a l u e  t h e o r e t i c  ap- 
proach t o  r i s k l e s s  a n d / o r  r i s k y  p r e f e r e n c e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  mentioned. 
I n  t h i s  approach  t h e  concep t  of s t r eng th -of -p re fe rence  ( F i s h b u r n ,  1970 
and Dyer and S a r i n ,  1979) p l a y s  a n  impor tan t  r o l e .  
2. UTILITY THEORY 
2.1. Expected U t i l i t y  Hypothes i s  of von Neumann-Morgenstern and Iden- 
t i f i c a t i o n  of  a  S i n g l e - A t t r i b u t e  U t i l i t y  F u n c t i o n  
L e t  
be  a  s e t  of  a l t e r n a t i v e  a c t i o n s  from which a  d e c i s i o n  maker must choose  
one a c t i o n .  Suppose t h e  c h o i c e  of aeA w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  consequence x  i 
w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  pi, and t h e  c h o i c e  of beA w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  consequence 
x  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  qi, and s o  f o r t h .  L e t  i 
be  a  s e t  of a l l  p o s s i b l e  consequences.  I n  t h i s  c a s e  
L e t  r e a l  f u n c t i o n  u be a  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  on X .  Then t h e  e x p e c t e d  u- 
t i l i t i e s  of a c t i o n s  a ,  b,  ... a r e  g i v e n ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  by 
The a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker chooses  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  ac- 
t i o n  a s  i f  he  maximizes h i s  e x p e c t e d  u t i l i t y  i s  c a l l e d  t h e  e x p e c t e d  u- 
t i l i t y  h y p o t h e s i s  of von Neumann and Morgenstern  (1944) .  I n  o t h e r  words 
t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker chooses  a n  a c t i o n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  normat ive  r u l e  
where a b b  d e n o t e s  "a i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  b", and a  - b  d e n o t e s  "a i s  in- 
d i f f e r e n t  t o  b". T h i s  r u l e  i s  c a l l e d  t h e  e x p e c t e d  u t i l i t y  r u l e .  U t i l -  
i t y  f u n c t i o n  which s a t i s f i e s  Eqns. (1) and ( 2 )  i s  u n i q u e l y  o b t a i n e d  w i -  
t h i n  t h e  c l a s s  o f  p o s i t i v e  l i n e a r  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n .  
F i g u r e  1 shows a  d e c i s i o n  t r e e  and l o t t e r i e s  which e x p l a i n  t h e  a- 
bove mentioned s i t u a t i o n ,  where la, Ib, ... d e n o t e  l o t t e r i e s  which t h e  
d e c i s i o n  maker comes a c r o s s  when he  chooses  t h e  a c t i o n  a ,  b,  ... , re- 
s p e c t  i v e l y  . 
DEFINITION 1. A c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  of l o t t e r y  I i s  a n  amount 2 such 
a  
t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  between t h e  amount 2 f o r  c e r t a i n  
and t h e  l o t t e r y  I . 
a  
From t h e  expec ted  u t i l i t y  h y p o t h e s i s  we o b t a i n  
I n  a  s e t  X o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  consequences ,  l e t  x0 and x* be t h e  
w o r s t  and t h e  b e s t  consequences ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  S i n c e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
i s  unique w i t h i n  t h e  c l a s s  of p o s i t i v e  l i n e a r  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s ,  l e t  u s  
n o r m a l i z e  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  a s  
0 L e t  <x*, p ,  xO> be a  l o t t e r y  y i e l d i n g  consequences  x* and x  w i t h  prob- 
a b i l i t i e s  p  and (1-p) ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  E s p e c i a l l y  when p=0.5, t h i s  l o t -  
0 
t e r y  i s  c a l l e d  t h e  f i f t y - f i f t y  l o t t e r y  and i s  deno ted  a s  <x*, x  >. L e t  
x  be a  c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  of  l o t t e r y  <x*, p,  xO>,  t h a t  i s  
t h e n  
I t  i s  e a s y  t o  i d e n t i f y  a  s i n g l e - a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  of a  
d e c i s i o n  maker by a s k i n g  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker a b o u t  t h e  c e r t a i n t y  equiva- 
l e n t s  of  some f i f t y - f i f t y  l o t t e r i e s  (Keeney and R a i f f a ,  1976) .  L e t  
t h e n  
u ( x ~ . ~ )  = 0.5u(x*) + 0.5u(x0)  = 0.5 
I f  we p l o t  t h e  p a i r s  ( x O ,  O) , (%.25,  0 . 2 5 ) ,  ( x  
0 .5 '  005)s  ( x ~ . ~ ~ ,  0075)s 
(x*, l ) ,  a  d iagram l i k e  F ig .  2  i s  o b t a i n e d .  By some c u r v e  f i t t i n g  t ech-  
n i q u e s ,  l i k e  l e a s t  s q u a r e  method, a s i n g l e - a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
u ( x )  can be i d e n t i f i e d .  
A t t i t u d e  of a  d e c i s i o n  maker toward r i s k  i s  d e s c r i b e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  
DEFINITION 2 .  A d e c i s i o n  maker i s  r i s k  a v e r s e  i f  he p r e f e r s  t h e  ex- 
- 
petted consequence x  ( = Z pixi ) of any l o t t e r i e s  t o  t h a t  l o t t e r y .  I n  
t h i s  c a s e  
I f  a  d e c i s i o n  maker i s  r i s k  a v e r s e ,  h i s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  concave a s  
shown i n  Fig.  2 .  Converse i s  a l s o  t r u e .  A d e c i s i o n  maker i s  r i s k  neu- 
t r a l  ( p r o n e  ) i f  and o n l y  i f  h i s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  l i n e a r  ( convex). 
2 . 2 .  U t i l i t y  Decomposi t ions  Based on A d d i t i v e  and U t i l i t y  Independence 
The f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t s  a r e  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  summary of Keeney and 
R a i f f a  (1976) .  
L e t  a  s p e c i f i c  consequence XEX be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by two a t t r i b u t e s  
(performance i n d i c e s )  Y and Z.  For  example, p r i c e  and performance of 
c a r s ,  n a t u r a l  environment and economy of a  n a t i o n ,  and s o  f o r t h .  I n  
t h i s  c a s e  a  s p e c i f i c  consequence XEX i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by a n  o r d e r e d  p a i r  
A s e t  of a l l  p o s s i b l e  consequences  X c a n  be w r i t t e n  a s  a  r e c t a n g u l a r  
s u b s e t  of a  two-dimensional  E u c l i d e a n  space  a s  X = Y x Z .  T h i s  consequ- 
ence  space  i s  c a l l e d  t w o - a t t r i b u t e  space .  Although Y and Z c o u l d  re- 
p r e s e n t  v e c t o r a t t r i b u t e ,  b o t h  of t h e s e  a r e  r egarded  a s  s i n g l e - a t t r i -  
b u t e  spaces  h e r e .  Two-a t t r ibu te  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  d e f i n e d  on X = Y x Z  
a s  u:YxZ + Re. 
DEFINITION 3 .  A t t r i b u t e  Y i s  u t i l i t y  independen t  of a t t r i b u t e  Z ,  de- 
n o t e d  Y(UI)Z, i f  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  l o t t e r i e s  on Y g i v e n  zcZ 
do  n o t  depend on t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  l e v e l  z.  
L e t  u s  assume t h a t  and z0 a r e  t h e  wors t  l e v e l  o f  t h e  a t t r i b u t e s  
Y and  Z ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  and y* and z* a r e  t h e  b e s t  l e v e l  of Y and Z ,  re- 
s p e c t  i v e l y  . 
DEFINITION 4 .  Given a n  a r b i t r a r y  zeZ, a normal ized  c o n d i t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n  u l ( y ( z )  on Y i s  d e f i n e d  by 
where  i t  is assumed t h a t  u(y*,z)  > U ( ~ ' , Z ) .  
S i m i l a r l y  u 2 ( z  1 y) on Z i s  a l s o  d e f i n e d  by 
0 
where  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  u (y ,z*)  > u ( y , x  1-  
From DEFINITION 4 we o b t a i n  
u l ( y O I z )  = u z ( z 0 l ~ )  = 0, u l ( y * ( z )  = u2(z*Iy)  = 1. 
From DEFINITIONS 3 and 4 t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e q u a t i o n s  h o l d ,  i f  Y(U1)Z. 
u l ( y l z )  = U ~ ( ~ J ~ O )  , f o r  a l l  z  E Z. 
I n  o t h e r  words u t i l i t y  independence i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  normal ized  condi- 
t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  do n o t  depend on t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o n d i t i o n a l  
l e v e l s .  
THEOREM 1. Y(UI)Z, i f  and o n l y  i f  
where u ( y , z )  i s  normal ized  a s  U ( ~ O , ~ O )  0  and u(y*,z*)  = 1, and a  = 
u(y*,zO) and b  = U ( ~ ' , Z * ) .  
THEOREM 2. A t t r i b u t e s  Y and Z a r e  mutua l ly  u t i l i t y  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  denot- 
ed  Y(MUI)Z, i f  and o n l y  i f  
where u ( y , z )  i s  normal ized ,  and a  and b  a r e  d e f i n e d  a s  b e f o r e .  
THEOREMS 1 and 2  g i v e  decompos i t ion  theorems under  t h e  u t i l i t y  in- 
dependence assumpt ions .  It  i s  c l e a r  from THEOREM 2  t h a t  i f  t h e  a t t r i -  
b u t e s  Y and Z a r e  m u t u a l l y  u t i l i t y  independen t ,  o n l y  one normal ized  
c o n d i t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  needs  t o  be a s s e s s e d  f o r  each  a t t r i b u t e .  
S i n c e  each  normal ized  c o n d i t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  s i n g l e - a t t r i -  
b u t e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  i t  c a n  be i d e n t i f i e d  by a s k i n g  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
maker t h e  c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t s  of  some 50-50 l o t t e r i e s  a s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  
t h e  p rev ious  s e c t i o n .  
DEFINITION 5.  A t t r i b u t e s  Y and Z a r e  a d d i t i v e  independen t ,  i f ,  f o r  ax- 
b i t r a r i l y  chosen y' E Y  and  Z '  E Z ,  
THEOREM 3 .  A t t r i b u t e s  Y and Z a r e  a d d i t i v e  independen t ,  i f  and o n l y  i f  
0 0 
u ( y , z >  = a u l ( y l z  + b u 2 ( z I y  
where 
Decomposi t ion theorem 3 i s  a s p e c i a l  c a s e  of t h e  decomposi t ion 
theorem 2 where a+b = 1 i n  Eqn. ( 7 ) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  a d d i t i v e  independ- 
e n c e  i s  a s p e c i a l  c a s e  of mutual  u t i l i t y  independence.  
2.3.  U t i l i t v  D e c o m ~ o s i t i o n s  Based on Convex D e ~ e n d e n c e  
The f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t s  a r e  due t o  Tamura and Nakamura (1983) .  T h i s  
s e c t i o n  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  c a s e  where 
0 
u l ( ~ / z )  f u l ( ~ l z  1, f o r  some z E Z 
~ ~ ( 4 ~ 1  f U ( ~ I Y ~ ) ,  f o r  some y E Y 
t h a t  i s ,  u t i l i t y  independence does  n o t  ho ld  between t h e  a t t r i b u t e s  Y 
and  Z. 
DEFINITION 6 .  A t t r i b u t e  Y i s  n-th o r d e r  convex dependent  on a t t r i b u t e  
Z ,  deno ted  Y(CDn)z, i f  t h e r e  e x i s t  d i s t i n c t  zO, z l ,  ..., Z ~ E Z  and r e a l  
f u n c t i o n s  lo, X1, ... , A n  on Z such  t h a t  t h e  normal ized  c o n d i t i o n a l  u- 
t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  u l ( y ( z )  can  be w r i t t e n  a s  
f o r  a l l  ~ E Y  and ~ E Z ,  where 
6 
i j denotes Kronecker delta and n is the smallest nonnegative integer 
for which Eqn. (9) holds. 
This definition says that if Y(CDn)Z, any normalized conditional 
utility function on Y can be described as a convex combination of (n+l) 
normalized conditional utility functions with different conditional 
levels where the coefficients Xi(z) are not necessarily nonnegative. 
Geometric illustration of DEFINITION 6 is shown in Fig. 3. Sup- 
pose three arbitrary normalized conditional utility functions ul(yl zo), 
ul(yI zl) and ul(yl z) are assessed on Y as shown in Fig. 3(a). If 
Y(CDO)Z, all the normalized conditional utility functions are identical 
as shown in Fig. 3(b). If Y(CD )Z, an arbitrary normalized conditional 1 
utility function ul(y(z) can be obtained as a convex combination of 
ul(y~xO) and ul(~lzl) as shown in Fig. 3(c). 
For n = 0,1, ... , if Y(CDn)Z, then Z is at most (n+l)th order con- 
vex dependent on Y. If Y(UI)Z, then Y(CDO)Z, and Z(U1)Y or Z(CD1)Y. In 
general if Y(CDn)Z, then Z satisfies one of the three properties, 
THEOREM 4. For n = 1,2,.. ., Y(CDn)Z, if and only if 
where 
c is a constant, and summation i = 1 to n* means i = 1,2, ..., rl,*. i j 
THEOREM 5. For n = 1,2, ..., Y(CDn)Z and Z(CDn)Y, if and only if 
where u(y,z) is normalized, a and b are defined as before, Eqn. (11) 
holds, 
and d and d' are constants. 
ij i j 
Exact expressions for c ij3 dij and d' can be found in Tamura and i j 
Nakamura (1983). 
We have obtained two main convex decomposition theorems which can 
represent a wide range of utility functions. Moreover, when the util- 
ity on the arbitrary point (yn,zn) has a particular value, that is, d' i j 
= 0, for all i, j in Eqn. (12), we can obtain one more decomposition of 
utility functions which does not depend on the point (yn,zn). This de- 
composition still satisfies Y(CDn)Z and Z(CDn)Y, so we call this new 
p r o p e r t y  reduced n-th o r d e r  convex dependence and d e n o t e  i t  by 
Y (RCDn) Z . 
We n o t e  t h a t  when d' = 0 ,  f o r  a l l  i ,  j and n  = 1, Eqn. ( 1 2 )  r e  
i j  
duces  t o  F i s h b u r n ' s  (1974)  b i l a t e r a l  decomposi t ion 
When n  = 1 and d' # 0 ,  t h a t  i s  Y(CD1)Z and z(CD1)Y, Eqn. ( 1 2 )  r e d u c e s  i j  
Equa t ion  (15)  i s  B e l l ' s  (1979)  decomposi t ion under  i n t e r p o l a t i o n  inde- 
pendence.  
On two s c a l a r  a t t r i b u t e s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  u- 
t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  c o n s t r u c t  t h e  p r e v i o u s  decompos i t ion  
models and t h e  convex decomposi t ion models is  shown i n  F i g .  4 .  By as- 
s e s s i n g  u t i l i t i e s  on t h e  heavy shaded l i n e s  and p o i n t s ,  we c a n  comple- 
t e l y  s p e c i f y  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  c a s e s  i n d i c a t e d  i n  F i g .  4 .  A s  
s e e n  from F ig .  4 ,  t h e  advan tage  of t h e  convex decompos i t ion  i s  t h a t  
o n l y  s i n g l e - a t t r i b u t e  c o n d i t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  need t o  be a s s e s s e d  
even f o r  high-order convex dependent  c a s e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  is r e l a t i v e l y  
e a s y  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s .  
F i s h b u r n  and Farquhar  (1982) have e s t a b l i s h e d  a n  a x i o m a t i c  ap- 
p roach  f o r  s e l e c t i n g  a  b a s i s  of normal ized  c o n d i t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  func- 
t i o n .  
2.4.  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  Convex Dependence 
For d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of convex dependence between 
two d i f f e r e n t  a t t r i b u t e s ,  we d i s c u s s  t h e  u t i l i t y  f o r  environment and 
consumption (Tamura and Nakamura, 1978) .  I n  t h i s  problem t h e r e  e x i s t s  
c o n f l i c t  between t h e s e  two a t t r i b u t e s ,  because  t h e  more we consume t h e  
more we p o l l u t e .  It w i l l  be shown t h a t  t h e  two a t t r i b u t e s ,  environment 
and consumption,  do n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  u t i l i t y  independence p r o p e r t y .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  we may want t o  t a k e  i n t o  accoun t  t h e  convex dependence p r c r  
p e r t y .  
L e t  Y and Z be t h e  a t t r i b u t e s  of  environment  and consumption,  re- 
s p e c t i v e l y ,  and eeY and  C E Z  be  t h e  a t t r i b u t e  l e v e l s .  We r e s t r i c t  t h e s e  
0 
a t t r i b u t e  l e v e l s  i n  eoS e (_ - e* and coS c 5 - c* where e = e means 
environment  i s  p o l l u t e d  and i s  i n  t h e  w o r s t  l e v e l ,  e = e* means no 
0 p o l l u t i o n  e x i s t s  and environment  i s  c l e a n ,  c = c means consumption i s  
i n  t h e  l o w e s t  l e v e l ,  and c = C* i n  t h e  h i g h e s t  l e v e l .  
Now we c o n s i d e r  how a normal ized c o n d i t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
u l ( e l c )  f o r  environment changes depending upon t h e  consumption l e v e l  c.  
It i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  environment changes a c c o r d i n g  t o  
0 t h e  consumption l e v e l  c. Comparing u l ( e ( c * )  w i t h  u l ( e ( c  ) t h e s e  normal- 
i z e d  c o n d i t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  drawn s c h e m a t i c a l l y  i n  Fig .  5 a ) .  
When c = c*, even i f  t h e  environment is  d e t e r i o r a t e d  from t h e  c l e a n  
l e v e l  ( e  = e*) ,  t h e  d e c r e a s e  of  u t i l i t y  i s  n o t  s o  r a p i d  i n  compensat ion 
f o r  h igh  consumption,  b u t  a s  t h e  environment  l e v e l  approaches  t o  t h e  
w o r s t  l e v e l ,  t h e  u t i l i t y  f o r  t h e  environment d e c r e a s e s  r a p i d l y .  When c 
0 
= c , t h e  d e c r e a s e  of  u t i l i t y  f o r  environment  i s  even f o r  any e n v i r o r r  
men ta l  l e v e l ,  because  t h e  consumption l e v e l  i s  s u p p r e s s e d  t o  a low 
l e v e l .  
Next, we c o n s i d e r  how a normal ized c o n d i t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
u ( c l e )  f o r  consumption changes depending upon t h e  env i ronmenta l  l e v e l .  2 
0 Comparing u ( c l e * )  w i t h  u 2 ( c l e  ) t h e s e  normal ized  c o n d i t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  2 
f u n c t i o n  i s  drawn s c h e m a t i c a l l y  i n  Fig.  5 b ) .  W b 3 - t  e = e*,  u t i l i t y  f o r  
consumption i n c r e a s e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  law of d i m i n i s h i n g  m a r g i n a l  u- 
0 t i l i t y .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  when e = e , t h e y  f e e l  t h a t  t h e  h i g h  con- 
sumption i s  a m a t t e r  of  c o u r s e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  of  u- 
t i l i t y  f o r  t h e  u n i t  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  consumption l e v e l  i s  v e r y  s m a l l  
when t h e  consumption l e v e l  i s  low. But t h e  u t i l i t y  f o r  consumption in- 
c r e a s e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  law of d i m i n i s h i n g  m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  a f t e r  t h e  
consumption l e v e l  moves t o  h i g h e r  l e v e l .  
Accord ing ly ,  t h e  t rade-off  between environment and consumption 
does  n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  u t i l i t y  independence p r o p e r t y ,  and hence t a k i n g  
i n t o  accoun t  t h e  convex dependence p r o p e r t y  we cou ld  c o n s t r u c t  a n  ap- 
p r o p r i a t e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  
3 .  ALGORITHM OF IDENTIFYING MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
For  i d e n t i f y i n g  a m u l t i a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  under  t h e  convex 
dependence c o n d i t i o n  ( i n c l u d i n g  0 - th  o r d e r ) ,  we need t o  f i n d  t h e  o r d e r  
of  convex dependence. T h i s  o r d e r  can be a s s e s s e d  a s  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
s t e p s :  D e f i n e  
0 
Step 0. Normalized conditional utility functions ul(y l z  1, ul(ylz*), 
u2(zJY0) and u2(zIy*) are assessed, and we draw the graph of them. If 
we can regard that 
then we decide that Y(CDO)Z and Z(CDO)Y, that is, Y(MU1)Z. If not go 
to Step 1. 
Step 1. n =  1 
Step 2. Normalized conditional utility functions u (ylz ),u ( y ~ z l ) , ~ ~ ~ ,  1 0 1 
ul(ylzn) and ul(ylz*) are assessed, and then ln and Un are obtained. 
Step 3 .  Linear equation 
is solved with respect to in. 
Step 4. We draw the graph of 
n * 
f(Y) = =i=O yJ1(Y lzi) 
Step 5. The graph of f(y) is compared with the graph of ul(y(zn). If 
we can regard that both curves are coincident within the allowable er- 
ror, we decide that Y(CDn)Z. If not, n+l+n and then go back to Step 2. 
These steps can be easily realized by using a graphic terminal of 
a large computer. 
Parameters a and b which appeared in THEOREMS 1 to 5 can be esti- 
mated as follows: We ask the decision maker the indifference probabil- 
ity p such that 
Then, we obtain 
Similarly, we ask the decision maker the indifference probability q 
such that 
Then, we obtain 
After obtaining the information for the order of convex depend- 
ence, normalized conditional utility functions and the scaling parame- 
ters a and b, we can construct a multiattribute utility function by us- 
ing a decomposition form described in THEOREMS 1 to 5. For two attri- 
bute cases we could draw indifference curves for the multiattribute u- 
tility function in two attribute space YxZ. 
4 .  GROUP UTILITY THEORY 
I n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  methods o f  s o c i a l  c h o i c e  o r  group d e c i s i o n  making 
t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  a t t i t u d e  of  e a c h  d e c i s i o n  maker ( i n d i v i d u a l  member of 
t h e  group)  has  been d e s c r i b e d  w i t h o u t  t a k i n g  i n t o  accoun t  t h e  u t i l i t y  
l e v e l  ( l e v e l  of  s a t i s f a c t i o n )  of  t h e  o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  makers ,  and s u c h  
p r e f e r e n c e  s t r u c t u r e s  have been a g g r e g a t e d  by some r u l e  f o r  group deci -  
s i o n  making. Keeney and Kirkwood's  (1975)  approach i s  a l s o  i n  t h i s  ca t -  
egory .  A s  t h e  r e s u l t  we have o f t e n  come a c r o s s  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  s o c i a l  
d e c i s i o n s  a s  s e e n  i n  so-cal led  v o t i n g  paradox.  A s  shown i n  Arrow's 
(1963)  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  theorem t h e r e  a r e  no p rocedures  f o r  o b t a i n i n g  a  
g roup  o r d e r i n g  of  t h e  v a r i o u s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  from t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  o r d i -  
n a l  r a n k i n g s  of  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t h a t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  f i v e  reasona- 
b l e  c r i t e r i a .  
I n  r e a l  s i t u a t i o n  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  a t t i t u d e  of each  d e c i s i o n  maker 
h e a v i l y  depends on t h e  outcomes o r  u t i l i t y  l e v e l s  o b t a i n e d  by t h e  o t h e r  
d e c i s i o n  makers. For  example a  d e c i s i o n  maker i s  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  h i s  low 
outcome and he  f e e l s  t h a t  t h e  g roup  u t i l i t y  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  even i f  
h i s  own u t i l i t y  l e v e l  i s  low, when t h e  o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  maker ' s  u t i l i t y  
l e v e l  o r  outcome i s  lower t h a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  h i s  outcome. On t h e  con t ra -  
r y ,  t h e  same d e c i s i o n  maker i s  n o t  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  h i s  h i g h  outcome when 
t h e  o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  maker 's  outcome i s  h i g h e r  t h a n  h i s  outcome. Hence, 
t h e  u t i l i t y  independence assumpt ion  among t h e  m u l t i p l e  d e c i s i o n  makers 
i s  n o t  a p p r o p r i a t e .  
E s s e n t i a l l y ,  i n  r e a l  s o c i a l  c h o i c e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p r e f e r e n c e  
which i s  based o n l y  on h i s  b e n e f i t ,  s h o u l d  n o t  be r e f l e c t e d  t o  t h e  so- 
c i e t y .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p r e f e r e n c e  which i s  based on s o c i a l  
e t h i c s  o r  moral ,  should  be r e f l e c t e d .  S y s t e m a t i c  methodologies  f o r  
s u c h  s o c i e t a l  d e c i s i o n  have been miss ing  and have been d e s i r e d  i n  many 
f i e l d s ;  economics, p o l i t i c s ,  b e h a v i o r a l  s c i e n c e ,  o p e r a t i o n s  r e s e a r c h ,  
and s o  f o r t h .  
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  a  g roup  u t i l i t y  t h e o r y  i s  d e s c r i b e d  based on t h e  
concep t  of convex dependence. The group d e c i s i o n  making by two (conf-  
l i c t i n g )  d e c i s i o n  makers i s  c o n s i d e r e d ,  where we d i s c u s s  a  s y s t e m a t i c  
way of d e s c r i b i n g  each  d e c i s i o n  maker 's  p r e f e r e n c e  which depends on t h e  
u t i l i t y  l e v e l  of  t h e  o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  maker. I n  o t h e r  words,  change of 
a t t i t u d e  of each  d e c i s i o n  maker towards t h e  group u t i l i t y  i s  d e s c r i b e d  
depending upon t h e  u t i l i t y  l e v e l  of  t h e  o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  maker. Group u- 
t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  t h e n  c o n s t r u c t e d  by a g g r e g a t i n g  such  p r e f e r e n c e  of  
e a c h  d e c i s i o n  maker. The f o l l o w i n g  development i s  due t o  Tamura and 
Yukimura (1983) .  
DEFINITION 7 .  L e t  U1xU2 d e n o t e  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  s p a c e ,  and l e t  
d e n o t e  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  d e c i s i o n  maker 1 
(DM1) and DM2 on t h e  m u l t i a t t r i b u t e  consequence s p a c e s  X1 and X 2 ,  res-  
p e c t i v e l y ,  where x . E X ~  ( i  = 1 , 2 )  d e n o t e s  a  s p e c i f i c  consequence f o r  
1 
D M i .  A group u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  W(x1,x2) i s  assumed t o  be d e s c r i b e d  a s  
We s h a l l  s i m p l i f y  t h e  n o t a t i o n  a s  f o l l o w s :  
0 
where x  and x * d e n o t e  t h e  w o r s t  and t h e  b e s t  consequences  of  D M i ,  i i 
0 
respectively, and hence ui and ui* denote.the utility level of DMi for 
the worst and the best consequences, respectively. We will describe how 
to construct w(ul,u2) in the following. 
DEFINITION 8. Given an arbitrary u2~U2 a normalized - conditional &roup 
utility function (NCGUF) w1(u11u2) of DM1 on U1 is defined by 
- - 
0 
where it is assumed that w(ul*,u2) > w(ul ,u2), ulO= 0, ul*= 1. 
Then, w1(u1(u2) is normalized as 
Similarly, NCGUF of DM2 w2(u21u1) can be defined by 
where w(ul ,u2*) > W(U~,U~~), u2 O= 0, u2*=l. It is also assumed that 
the group utility function w(ul,u2) is normalized so that 
From mathematical point of view formulas of group utility func- 
tions are identical with those of multiattribute utility functions. In 
THEOREMS 1 to 5 if we replace the symbols as shown in Table 1, we could 
obtain the decomposition forms of group utility functions. 
NCGUF (24) of DM1 represents his subjective preference structure 
for the group utility as a function of his own utility level under the 
condition that the utility level of DM2 is given. NCGUFs (24) and (25) 
w i l l  p l a y  an i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  f o r  c o n s t r u c t i n g  a  group u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  
Convex dependence between two d e c i s i o n  makers i s  d e f i n e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  
DEFINITION 9.  U t i l i t y  of DM1 i s  s a i d  t o  be n-th o r d e r  convex dependent  
on t h e  u t i l i t y  of DM2, deno ted  U1(CDn)U2, i f  NCGUF of  DM1 wl(ul Iu2) can  
be d e s c r i b e d  a s  a  convex combina t ion  of ( d l )  NCGUFs of DM1 w1 (u l  I U ~ ~ ) ,  
i = O , l ,  ..., n  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  c o n d i t i o n a l  l e v e l s .  
F o r  c l a r i f y i n g  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of convex dependence between 
two ( c o n f l i c t i n g )  d e c i s i o n  makers,  we d e a l  wi th  a  d e c i s i o n  making p r o b  
lem f o r  s i t i n g  a  major  a i r p o r t ,  where we d e s c r i b e  how t o  r e p r e s e n t  
NCGUFs of each  d e c i s i o n  maker t a k i n g  i n t o  accoun t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of  t h e  
o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  maker. 
L e t  DM1 be t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  r e g i o n a l  i n h a b i t a n t s  and DM2 
t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  d e v e l o p e r  of  t h e  a i r p o r t .  E x i s t e n c e  of a  be- 
n e v o l e n t  d i c t a t o r ,  who m e d i a t e s  DM1 and DM2 by a s s e s s i n g  t h e  s c a l i n g  
c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  is  p o s t u l a t e d .  We can  r e g a r d  t h a t  DM1 wishes  t o  c o n s t r u c t  
t h e  a i r p o r t  a s  f a r  f rom t h e  r e g i o n a l  a r e a  a s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  r e d u c i n g  t h e  
env i ronmenta l  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  of  t h e  a i r p o r t .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  DM2 
wishes  t o  c o n s t r u c t  t h e  a i r p o r t  a t  t h e  c l o s e r  l o c a t i o n  t o  c i t y  f o r  con- 
v e n i e n c e  and e f f i c i e n c y  of  t h e  a i r p o r t .  T h e r e f o r e ,  DM1 and DM2 a r e  o b  
v i o u s l y  c o n f l i c t i n g .  
We c o n s i d e r  two m u t u a l l y  u t i l i t y  independent  c a s e s  and one mutual- 
l y  f i r s t  o r d e r  convex dependent  c a s e  and i n t e r p r e t  each  c a s e .  
Case A: U1(MUI)U2 
Suppose t h e  c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t s  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  NCGUFs of  DM1 
and DM2 a r e  a s s e s s e d  a s  shown i n  Fig .  6 .  Convex NCGUFs i n  t h i s  f i g u r e  
show t h a t  bo th  DM1 and  DM2 do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  group u t i l i t y  i s  h i g h  
u n l e s s  t h e  u t i l i t y  l e v e l s  of  t h e i r  own a r e  v e r y  h i g h ,  and t h a t  each  
D M ' S  a t t i t u d e  towards  t h e  g roup  u t i l i t y  does  n o t  depend on t h e  u t i l i t y  
l e v e l  of t h e  o t h e r  DM. I n  o t h e r  words,  e a c h  DM i s  m u t u a l l y  u t i l i t y  in- 
dependen t  and t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  is  s e l f i s h  and s tubborn .  
I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  g roup  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  d e s c r i b e d  a s  
Case B: Keeney-Kirkwood model 
Suppose t h e  c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t s  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  NCGUFs o f  DM1 
a n d  DM2 a r e  a s s e s s e d  a s  shown i n  F ig .  7 .  L i n e a r  NCGUFs i n  t h i s  f i g u r e  
show t h a t  NCGUF o f  e a c h  DM i s  e q u a l  t o  h i s  own u t i l i t y  l e v e l .  I n  t h i s  
case e a c h  DM i s  a g a i n  m u t u a l l y  u t i l i t y  independen t  and h i s  a t t i t u d e  to- 
wards  t h e  group u t i l i t y  i s  s t u b b o r n  b u t  n o t  a s  s e l f i s h  a s  i n  Case A .  
0 I n  t h i s  c a s e  w ( U  ( U  O) = u  w ( u  lu ) = u2 i n  Eqn. ( 2 6 ) ,  and 1 1 2  1 ' 2 2 1  
t h e  g roup  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  d e s c r i b e d  a s  
Case C: U1(CD1)U2 and U2(CD1)U1 
Suppose t h e  c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t s  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  NCGUFs of DM1 
a n d  DM2 a r e  a s s e s s e d  a s  shown i n  F ig .  8.  Fur the rmore ,  suppose  t h e  
f i r s t  o r d e r  convex dependence between DM1 and DM2 i s  a s s u r e d .  T h i s  
means t h a t  p r e f e r e n c e  a t t i t u d e  of DM1 (DM2) t o  t h e  group u t i l i t y  v a r i e s  
depending upon t h e  u t i l i t y  l e v e l  of DM2 (DMl). Even when t h e  u t i l i t y  
0 l e v e l  of DM2 i s  a t  t h e  w o r s t  l e v e l  (u2 - U2 ), t h e  a t t i t u d e  of DM1 
towards  t h e  group u t i l i t y  i s  s e l f i s h  f o r  low ul ,  because  t h e  environ-  
m e n t a l  impact of t h e  a i r p o r t  t o  DM1 i s  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .  But f o r  h i g h e r  
u1 t h e  a t t i t u d e  of DM1 i s  changed t o  be more g e n t l e .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, when t h e  u t i l i t y  l e v e l  of DM2 i s  a t  t h e  b e s t  
l e v e l  (u2 = u2*) ,  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of DM1 towards  t h e  group u t i l i t y  i s  a l -  
ways s e l f i s h .  I n  o t h e r  words,  when t h e  u t i l i t y  l e v e l  of DM2 i s  h i g h ,  
DM1 does n o t  f e e l  t h a t  g roup  u t i l i t y  i s  high  u n l e s s  h i s  own u t i l i t y  
l e v e l  is  v e r y  high.  T h i s  c a n  be i n t e r p r e t e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  g roup  d e c i s i o n  
DM1 i s  c la iming  e q u i t y  by comparing h i s  own u t i l i t y  l e v e l  w i t h  t h a t  of 
DM2. When t h e  u t i l i t y  l e v e l  of  DM1 i s  a t  t h e  wors t  l e v e l  (u l  = u l O ) ,  
t h e  a t t i t u d e  of DM2 i s  g e n t l e  and sympathe t i c ,  but  when t h e  u t i l i t y  
l e v e l  of DM1 i s  a t  t h e  b e s t  l e v e l  (u l  = ul*),  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of  DM2 i s  
changed t o  be s l i g h t l y  s e l f - c e n t e r e d .  
I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  g roup  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  is  d e s c r i b e d  a s  Eqn. ( 1 5 )  
where t h e  symbols i n  Eqn. ( 1 5 )  a r e  r e p l a c e d  accord ing  a s  T a b l e  1. 
A s  shown i n  Case C t h e  concep t  of convex dependence makes i t  pos- 
s i b l e  t o  d e s c r i b e  i n  NCGUFs t h e  change of a t t i t u d e  of  e a c h  d e c i s i o n  
maker depending upon t h e  u t i l i t y  l e v e l  of t h e  o t h e r  d e c i s i o n  maker. By 
u s i n g  t h e  group u t i l i t y  t h e o r y  based on t h e  concept  of convex depend- 
e n c e ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  o f f e r  c l e a r  i n f o r m a t i o n  of v a r i o u s  p r e f e r e n c e  
o r d e r i n g s  f o r  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  depending upon t h e  v a r i o u s  a t t i t u d e  of 
e a c h  d e c i s i o n  maker i n  t h e  group and v a r i o u s  c a s e s  f o r  t h e  v a l u e s  of  
s c a l i n g  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a s s e s s e d  by a  benevo len t  d i c t a t o r .  
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
C e n t e r i n g  around t h e  concep t  of convex dependence m u l t i a t t r i b u t e  
u t i l i t y  t h e o r y  and group u t i l i t y  t h e o r y  a r e  b r i e f l y  surveyed f o r  mul t i -  
o b j e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  making. A major  advan tage  of t h e  convex decomposi- 
t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e y  i n c l u d e  many p r e v i o u s  decompos i t ions  s u c h  a s  addi- 
t i v e ,  m u l t i p l i c a t i v e ,  b i l a t e r a l  and i n t e r p o l a t i o n  decompos i t ions  a s  
s p e c i a l  c a s e s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  depending upon t h e  complex i ty  of t r a d e - o f f s  
t h e  convex decompos i t ions  c o u l d  p r o v i d e  more f l e x i b l e  m u l t i a t t r i b u t e  
a n d / o r  group u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  f o r  modeling p r e f e r e n c e s  of a  d e c i s i o n  
maker o r  m u l t i p l e  ( c o n f l i c t i n g )  d e c i s i o n  makers. 
S i n c e  t h e  convex decompos i t ions  need o n l y  s i n g l e - a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s  even f o r  h igh-order  convex dependent  c a s e s ,  i t  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  
e a s y  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  m u l t i a t t r i b u t e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s .  Graph ic  termi- 
n a l s  of a l a r g e - s c a l e  computer c o u l d  be e f f e c t i v e l y  used f o r  t h i s  p u r  
pose .  
We d i d n ' t  i n c l u d e  v a l u e  t h e o r e t i c  approach (Dyer and S a r i n ,  1979, 
and  S a r i n ,  1983) i n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  however, r i s k l e s s  a n d / o r  r i s k y  p r e f e r  
e n c e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  based on t h e  v a l u e  t h e o r e t i c  approach i s  a n  i m p o r  
t a n t  t o p i c  f o r  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h .  Under t h i s  approach i t  might  be pos- 
s i b l e  t o  d i s c r i m i n a t e  a  d e c i s i o n  maker ' s  s t r e n g t h - o f - p r e f e r e n c e  and t h e  
a t t i t u d e  towards  r i s k .  
The approach  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h i s  paper  a r e  based on t h e  expec ted  u- 
t i l i t y  h y p o t h e s i s  of von Neurnann and Morgenstern  (1944) .  Many paradox- 
e s  (e .g .  A l l a i s  and Hagen, 1979,  and Kahneman and Tversky ,  1979) have 
been observed which v i o l a t e  p a r t i c u l a r  axioms. For  overcoming t h i s  d i f -  
f i c u l t y  n o n l i n e a r  u t i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  (Nakamura, 1984)  i s  b e i n g  i n v e s t i -  
g a t e d .  
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FIGURE 4 Assigning utilities for heavy shaded consequences complete- 
ly specifies the utility functions in the cases indicated. 
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FIGURE 5 Normalized conditional utility functions 
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FIGURE 6 NCGUFs for Case A. 
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TABLE 1 Correspondence of symbols between multiattribute 
utility theory and group utility theory. 





Two-attribute utility function: 
U(Y,Z> 
Normalized conditional utility 
functions: ul(ylz), u2(zly) 
Group utility theory 
Utility function space for 
two DMs: Xu2 
Utility level of each DM: 
u EU 1 1' u EU 2 2 
Group utility function for 
two DMs : w( ul , u2) 
NCGUFs: 
w,(ul Iu2), w2(u2 lul) 
